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Abstract: 
 
The chapter explores current stance of developments in Serbian credit market, by 
looking at credit aggregates and interest rates. Although, there are signs of weak 
credit market, full scale credit crunch is so far avoided thanks to efforts coordinated 
by the key stakeholders: IMF, National Bank of Serbia and foreign banking groups. 
The chapter provides an econometric analysis of the macroeconomic and macro-
financial determinants of the credit growth for Serbia. We employed multiple linear 
regressions and found country risk premium, exchange rate risk premium and real 
exchange rate to be the variables with power to explain credit growth. The chapter 
also discusses some policy options to address “credit cuts – rising rates” scenario, 
squeezing out SMEs, excessive liability formation and credit euroization.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Although it is probably too early to attempt a definitive evaluation of any 
consequence of the recent global financial turmoil, in what follows we will try to 
shed some lights on the issue of worsening conditions on a local credit market.  
 
For the Republic of Serbia last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 were no 
doubt turbulent times. After several good years - a lasting period of rapid credit 
growth, the global crisis spilled over into the local market. Depositors’ rush joined 
forces with foreign capital outflows, which taken together distressed both the local 
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banking industry and the currency market. National currency rapidly lost its value 
against the Euro, international reserves started melting down as well as banks’ own 
resources that immediately caused contraction in credit activity. In less than a 
decade Serbian credit market passed through diametrically opposed states of 
disequilibria. Policy makers failed to smooth credit growth and left the economy 
dangerously exposed to the boom-bust cycle.  
 
In remainder of the chapter we will search for evidence of rapid transformation of 
Serbian credit market from “credit boom” to “credit crunch”. The chapter proceeds 
as follows. Section two introduces basic concepts of credit market disequilibria and 
main dilemmas in that regard. Section three firstly reviews the dynamics of main 
credit aggregates and then turns to discussing interest rates. Section four deploys 
multiple linear regressions to explore and evaluate determinants of credit growth. 
Section five discusses a set of policy options. In the final section we go on to 
conclude.  
CREDIT MARKET DISEQUILIBRIA – THE CONCEPT OF CREDIT CRUNCH AND BASIC 
DILEMMAS 
Credit restrictions are often more than simple reflection of changes in available 
resources. The restrictions go hand in hand with the “flight to quality” behaviour, i.e. 
portfolio readjustment toward safe asset(s), with monetary claims or government 
debt being the most suitable candidates. The behaviour is well-known as monetary 
channel that transmits banking disturbances (explained in Friedman and Schwartz, 
1963). Since Bernanke’s (1983) seminal paper, it is well understood that apart from 
the monetary channel, banking disturbances influence economic activity by 
decreasing the efficiency of credit intermediation, and consequently by rising the 
costs of credit intermediation. Hence, rising spread between credit interest rate and 
deposit rate additionally constrains the business operations. Namely, this means 
that end-users of banking intermediation are being awarded less for financial 
surpluses and pay more when use bank funds to finance their deficits. Moreover, 
credit restrictions typically hit harder those economic sectors that are already the 
most dependent on banking sector, i.e. SMEs and start-ups (Dennis, 2008; Toçi and 
Hashi 2009, Yigui and Shumin, 2010). The lack of credit resources available to the 
SMEs is another way for credit market to influence a given economy. All those 
elements might colour credit crunch phenomenon.  
 
Despite its unquestioned practical importance, credit crunch is not uniquely defined 
concept. It might come as a surprise that economic theory delivers many definitions 
of credit crunch. Among the simplest definitions is the one given by Udell (2009, p. 
1), which defines “a credit crunch as a significant contraction in the supply of credit 
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reflected in a tightening of credit conditions”. Similarly, Bernanke and Lown (2001, p. 
207) define it as “a significant leftward shift in the supply curve for bank loans, 
holding constant both the safe real interest rate and the quality of potential 
borrowers (italics added)”. It means that less funds would be available to borrowers 
at any given loan rate. Although, the definition is centred around adjustments of 
credit supply, it does not exclude that in some specific occasions the curve would 
shift to the left so as to increase the loan rate with less visible effect on the volume 
itself. The definition might look clear enough and in a way elegant as it could be in 
theory, but to operate with it empirically is not as easy as it might appear. First of all, 
both elements that we need to stay constant are expected to change as credit 
conditions worsen. The safe interest rate would probably reflect portfolio 
readjustments toward safe assets, while quality of borrowers would change either 
because economy perspectives and business climate would change, or because the 
main creditors would shift to less aggressive credit allocation.  
 
Further, conditions of credit supply and demand are mutually dependent. That 
makes it extremely hard to distinguish what comes first: if supply accommodates to 
changes in demand or vice versa. A part of the complexity comes because quantities, 
credit supply or credit demand, are not directly observable. The official reporting 
practice gives us notice only about the quantity of funds which creditors and 
borrowers agree to exchange upon. We have never an idea if the demand is in 
excess or maybe the supply. Therefore, an empirical study of any credit crunch 
episode must look at the changes in amount of credit outstanding in order to 
pinpoint any trend reversals. 
 
It follows that there is no clear idea whether credit crunch represents an exclusively 
supply-side phenomenon or otherwise, comes about as some mixture of 
developments stemming from both supply and demand side of the credit market 
(Ghosh, 2010). The issue is important for the policy stance, since if the contraction of 
credit is caused by weak credit demand it is probably only another reflection of 
economy’s slowdown. If not, the causality is exactly the opposite, and merits 
scrutiny.  
 
In addition, credit crunch can be taken as an independent cause of economic 
slowdown if the credit contraction is not followed by simultaneous contraction in 
the banks’ financial resources, while in cases when loanable funds reduce in extent 
of reduction of financial resources (i.e. without additional amplifying portfolio shift 
toward safe assets) credit crunch is rather channel that transmit already present 
crisis signals. Thus, it does not cause but rather propagates an economic crisis. If 
contraction of funds available to creditors for lending (loanable funds) precedes 
credit cuts, fewer funds available to borrowers are only the mirror image of fewer 
funds available to creditors. This phenomenon is known as capital crunch. 
 Marinković S., Malović M. 281 
 
Otherwise, the credit cut is to be a consequence of banks’ assets reallocation, or 
determinants that spur substitution out of claims that are now given or perceived 
riskier. Any deeper analysis must go further to discuss what drives the asset 
substitution. If the creditors were driven out of lending to private entities because of 
their autonomous perception of relative risk (private entities are perceived riskier), 
the way to solve the problem differs from the path taken to be right response if the 
reallocation is forced by regulator (given riskier). Berger and Udell (1994) found the 
risk-based capital regulation, imposed to creditors during the banking and saving and 
loans crisis in the 1990s, responsible for the credit crunch. Similarly, Bernauer and 
Koubi (2004) found the same pattern in US and Japanese policy response to 
endangered bank solvency.  
 
If the bank solvency protective measures can precipitate credit crunch, does the 
same hold for liquidity protective measures? If the former is the case, most plausible 
outcome would be shrinkage of liabilities and assets, while if the latter is the case 
plausible outcome would be flight to quality. Certainly, both lines of policy response 
may end up having the same outcome: fewer funds available to private sector. The 
type of banking problems that Serbia faced in the fall of 2008 was predominantly 
liquidity driven. The bank solvency was not an issue of primary concern, hence the 
authorities have seen no reason to employ solvency protection measures. The initial 
package of measures taken by NBS and Serbian Government was designed to stop 
depositors’ run. The change in reserve requirement policy released excess dinar 
liquidity and made existing international reserves available to meet exploding 
demand for foreign assets, while holding back downward pressure on the national 
currency. It was an effective firefighting measure (Marinković and Jemović, 2011). 
Increase of official rate (2-weeks repo), which took place when crisis already broke 
out, was somewhat contradictory to the previous measures, and raises the question 
whether there was a bit of confusion in policy response.  
 
In the banking systems (and credit markets) which depend on external funds, liability 
contraction, and thus capital crunch, becomes the explanation that is more 
plausible. Therefore, in searching for culprits, thorough analysis must examine the 
driving forces of external capital movement. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), 
Staikouras (2004) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) found that credit crunch often 
comes jointly with other financial disturbances, e.g. with liquidity squeeze, or 
currency crisis. There is a rationale for this empirical regularity. Bank liquidity 
squeeze and currency crisis (closely related to balance of payment crisis) have 
something in common. Both can be a consequence of shrinkage of bank resources, 
with former being a consequence of a bank run and the latter a consequence of a 
foreign credit outflow. In those circumstances, banking sector is forced to respond to 
loosing funds. As an immediate effect of contracting liability side of the balance 
sheet, reduction of reserve assets position occurs. Further effects will depend on 
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whether the reserve assets position is returned to its previous level, or to the 
contrary, reserves-to-deposits ratio rise above its pre-crisis level. Precisely this will 
determine in what extent contraction of liability side will be transformed into 
contraction of credit activity.  
FROM CREDIT BOOM TO CREDIT CRUNCH: SPOTLIGHT ON CREDIT MARKET 
CONDITIONS 
Bank credit aggregates 
Republic of Serbia, as well many other countries, initially managed to speed up the 
growth of its credit market by opening its capital account. At the very turn of the 
millennium credit growth to private sector was set up for rising, and the trend of 
two-digit growth rate continued for several years. Strong credit growth was deemed 
excessive by many observers and was accompanied by the rise of external or foreign 
currency denominated debt of private sector, which exacerbated economy’s fragility 
especially in the event of a global downturn and sudden reversal of foreign credit 
flow. The rapid credit growth has already been documented in some of the fast 
developing neighbouring countries (Djankov et al., 2007). The growth has been an 
ardently debated issue in academia, but not all of the researchers have been aware 
of its possibly adverse consequences. There are many papers (Kraft and Jankov, 
2005; Cottarelli et al. 2005; Boissay et al., 2005; Égert et al. 2006; Kiss et al., 2006; 
Zdzienicka, 2009) that present some evidence in favour of the importance of credit 
growth in the region. It is easy to understand that ones that are more recent were 
more alert to the danger. Some of earlier published papers found that credit-to-GDP 
hike can be explained as convergence toward equilibrium. Kiss et al. (2006) conclude 
that the rapid credit growth experienced in recent years in the Central and Eastern 
Europe is basically considered to be equilibrium convergence path (with some 
reservation in regards to Baltic states). Bossay et al. (2005) findings confront the 
aforementioned view, in a way that exhibited credit growth cannot be explained 
solely on the basis of fast economic growth, declining interest rates or the catching-
up in incomes. Additionally, they suggest that the choice of exchange rate regime 
can be usefully implemented as a determinant of credit growth. With strong reliance 
on foreign resources, as a common feature, countries in the region were able to 
boost foreign credit inflow opting for more rigid exchange rate regime. We shall 
return to the issue of credit growth determinants in later sections of the chapter.  
 
Whether or not the credit growth has been excessive, and if it has, how much of it 
has been equilibrium divergence, still is a matter of debate. Nevertheless, one can 
be quite sure about the link between pre-crisis credit growth intensity and the 
impact of recession that follows it. By exploring severity of recession in Central and 
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Eastern European countries, Llorca and Redžepagić (2009) found an empirical 
regularity that the countries which were most able to boost foreign capital inflow, at 
the same time were the ones which were very hard hit by the crisis, underling that 
the fast growing lays at the very roots of the incoming recession.  
 
Some earlier studies (Marinković, 2009a) found clear-cut reversal in bank credit to 
private sector. After years-long continuously rising bank credit to private sector, 
things turned soar in the last quarter of 2008. The cut in available resources was 
short-lasting and largely caused by deposits contraction. Most recent data show (see 
Table 2 for quarterly decomposing) no evidence of remarkable contraction of credit 
activity, although growth deceleration seems unquestionable.  
 
Table 1:Bank Credit to Private Sector (yearly data) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20121 
BCPS  
(in bln. RSD) 
572.4 802.4 1,082.4 1,236.8 1,560.3 1,656.4 1,738.6 
BCPS  
(in mln. EUR) 
7,246 10,127 12,217 12,899 14,790 15,829 15,778 
BCPS/GDP (in %) 31.09 35.57 37.39 44.54 53.64 51.87 – 
BCPS growth rates (y-t-y) 
 In RSD 17.30 40.18 34.89 14.26 26.15 6.15 4.96 
 Deflated by CPI 10.04 26.29 24.21 7.19 14.37 –0.78 4.02 
 In EUR 26.95 39.77 20.64 5.58 14.66 7.03 –0.32 
Memoranda        
 Net NPL/Net 
loans 
4.12 3.81 5.29 8.53 N/A N/A N/A 
 Gross NPL/Gross 
loan 
N/A N/A 11.3 15.7 16.9 18.81 N/A 
Notes: 
1 
Data on February; 
 
Data on bank credit to private sector, and consequently year-on-year growth rates, 
are given in nominal terms (RSD), deflated by CPI based inflation, and in Euro terms 
as well. The difference between Euro and CPI deflated growth rates is largely the 
consequence of PPP disparities. Huge real appreciation of local currency during 
2011, made the Euro growth rate standing over those deflated by CPI. It is also the 
case with the period before the currency-banking turmoil. Rapid depreciation that 
followed the turmoil at the end of 2008 and early in 2009 reversed that trend. It is 
again the case with the first two months of the current year.  
 
For the first time, on yearly basis, credit growth rate (deflated by CPI) becomes 
negative in last year. Although the growth rate, when converged to the Euro, still 
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stays positive, it is clear sign of sudden stop. The scope of the problem might be far 
less benign if the stock of nonperforming loans remained unaltered. Unfortunately, 
the issue of nonperforming loans (NPL) measured either as a share of net NPL to net 
of charge-offs total loans or as a share of gross NPL to gross loans, set up for 
increasing in 2007, and the trend continues all the way up to now.  
Direct cross-border financing 
The data presented above (Table 1) are concerned with credit activity of local banks, 
and therefore completely ignore sources of local credit growth that come from 
overseas, bypassing the local banking industry. Since 2006, direct cross-border 
borrowing of enterprises becomes equally important flow that feeds credit boom. It 
was seen as a way to circumvent prudential regulation (reserve requirements) which 
made banks’ borrowings from abroad prohibitively expensive. In the Table 2 below, 
presented are the data on cross-border loans together with the data on bank credit 
to private sector, for the last seven quarters. The data for cross-border loans comes 
also from official NBS statistics. However, although the data cover end-of-period 
amounts outstanding (in Euro), they are not completely comparable. The data on 
bank credit to private sector are regularly reported net of charge-offs, while cross-
borders are reported in gross amount. Taking into account growing issue of 
nonperforming loans, and having in mind that all the cross-border loans are granted 
to the corporate sector, we can conclude that falling share of cross borders in total 
credit probably indicates that credit environment is becoming more hostile for 
corporate sector. 
 
Table 2: Credit aggregates – quarterly survey on recent data (in mln. EUR) 
 2010 2011 2012 
 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
1 
Bank Credit to 
Private Sector 14,109.7 14,790.4 15,000.7 15,551.3 15,800.6 15,829.9 15,778.9 
Cross-borders 9,816.2 9,617.4 9,427.6 9,288.5 9,090.9 8,988.0 9,132.3 
Total Credit 23,925.9 24,407.8 24,428.3 24,839.8 24,891.5 24,817.9 24,911.2 
Share of Cross- 
borders 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 
Memorandum        
Gross NPL/Gross 
loans  17.8 16.9 17.1 18.6 18.8 N/A N/A 
Notes: 
1 
Data on February; 
 
By looking at the aggregate figures we see no alarming trend in the credit activity. 
This is because a pre-emptive action prevented the worsening of credit conditions to 
deteriorate into the full-blown, sharp credit crunch. It has been well understood 
early in the crisis that more pronounced foreign capital outflow would have much 
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stronger detrimental impact on the credit market dynamics if the authorities took no 
action. The multilateral policy response at hand is known in public discourse as the 
“Wiener gentlemen agreement”. The agreement was signed by representatives of 
parent banking groups and NBS, initiated and come into place under auspice of IMF. 
Although the agreement was there to provide the same extent of foreign bank credit 
exposure to the local credit market (initially assessed at 10.8 billion Euros) for the 
following year, it was rolled over for an additional year. In return, NBS offered some 
concessions to the foreign banks, i.e. full access to Serbian Dinar- and Euro-
denominated liquidity arrangements. It was then that currency swap auction facility 
has been introduced, although it has actually never been used in full capacity. The 
agreement has simply provided a temporary insurance against credit crunch. 
Although the agreement is not enforced by the law, it is so far considered to be 
reasonably waterproof and binding. In the future it will last for as long as all the 
parties continue to consider it beneficial. The coalition that assembles the main 
stakeholders succeeded in alleviating the incoming credit crunch, but it was a 
firefighting measure capable of postponing the issue against a milder and shorter-
lasting crisis, but not indefinitely. 
Interest rate dynamics and cost of credit 
A part of the credit market story could be told by simply looking at the market 
volume. In order to move on and unfold another part of the story we must explore 
what happened to the price of credit, i.e. interest rates. However, volume-price 
relationship in credit markets differs from those which have been seen in markets 
where is reasonable to assume that prices have neither sorting nor incentive effects. 
In such markets it is assumed that excess demand will drive the price up, the same as 
excess supply will drive it down. We know from the theory that interest rate, i.e. the 
price of credit resources, often times does not clear the market, since creditors, 
faced with excess demand, much rather credit-ration the borrowers than are 
inclined to charge higher rates.  
 
It is assumed in theory that even in tranquil times there is some rationing of credit 
supply (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Credit rationing, which is per se supply side 
phenomenon, is taken to be a regular follower of credit markets with imperfect 
information, regardless of whether there’s a crisis or not. One way of testing for 
presence of credit rationing is to explore the credit price (loan rate) stickiness. If the 
rate is indeed sticky it would imply that no matter how tight credit conditions may 
be, loan rate would stay the same. Berger and Udell (1992) assume that credit 
rationing most likely occurs in the time periods in which credit crunch is operative, 
but they fail to find conclusive results that loan rates are sticky after all. Therefore, it 
might be beneficial reviewing what happens to the loan rate, as well as other asset 
and liability rates as a sign of changing conditions in credit markets.  
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As underlined in Bernanke and Lown (2001) two key variables that have to hold 
constant in order to apply the above credit crunch definition, are safe (risk-free) 
interest rate and average quality of borrowers. The best proxy for the safe rate is the 
yield offered on government securities. Serbian public debt market offers issues 
which vary in the currency of denomination. It would be wrong to assign too much 
weight in analysis to RSD denominated treasury issues, since the market is shallow, 
but the data are still informative, especially in comparison to RSD denominated 
credit rate. The difference between them, if they are of the same maturity, is known 
as a default risk premium. The default risk premium is huge, but marks no change in 
last year, as opposed to the rates which determine it, that indeed have decreased 
over time. Solely on the basis of this development, we can conclude that Serbian 
credit market is perhaps slowly calming down.  
 
The yield on treasury bonds denominated in the Euro (series A) cannot be calculated 
on the assumption of constant maturity, since all series mature on May 31st each 
consecutive year. Any data point concerns the yield on bond maturing next year, and 
consequently, the reported yields are related to bonds with remaining maturity of 
not more than five (as of March) and not less than two quarters (as of December). 
But the differences are next to irrelevant, since the yield curve was almost flat most 
of the time. This yield, when compared with the yield on bond issued with the same 
maturity and the same currency by the relevant foreign government, has great 
potential to explain credit growth in a capital-importing country.  
 
The role of official reference rate (2W repo rate) depends on the strength of interest 
rate channel of monetary transmission. The interpretation of the role of this rate is 
fairly similar to that of RSD treasury issues.  
 
The rate which most significantly influences the local credit market is EURIBOR. This 
is the chief international reference rate for the Serbian credit market, widely used by 
local banking industry both when raising and lending funds. The data in the Table 3 
concern LIBOR, but the differences are rather irrelevant.  
 
Table 3: Selected interest rates on bank assets and liabilities (in %, p.a.) 
 2010 2011 2012 
 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 
Cost of bank funds1        
  LIBOR (6M EUR) 1.13 1.18 1.50 1.76 1.70 1.56 1.242 
  Deposits (3–12M EUR) 3.58 4.66 4.20 4.29 3.68 4.69 4.37 
  Deposits (3–12M RSD) 9.05 10.63 11.76 10.73 9.87 9.64 9.40 
Yield on bank assets        
  Treasury forex bonds2 3.45 4.64 5.68 5.35 6.00 6.49 6.10 
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 2010 2011 2012 
 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 
  Treasury bills (6M) 12.40 14.73 12.87 12.18 11.90 10.85 10.48 
  Repo rate (2W) 8.90 11.17 12.12 12.22 11.39 9.82 9.50 
  Credit rate (RSD) 29.51 28.46 28.12 27.66 27.46 25.73 25.98 
  Credit rate (EUR) 9.66 8.28 9.54 9.65 8.55 9.96 8.65 
Notes: 
1
 Data concern weighted average for reported month, except for LIBOR, which is 
end of period rate; 
2 
Data on February; 
3 
Yield on treasury bonds (series A) concerns 
changing maturity.   
 
Several, for credit market very informative, financial indicators could be constructed 
simply by comparing some of those rates. Besides already mentioned default risk 
premium, for instance, difference between LIBOR and the local currency deposit rate 
of identical maturity yields the so called nominal interest rate differential, which is 
very useful in determining the way funds will flow across borders. Similarly, by 
comparing the yield available on treasury securities denominated in different 
currencies but issued under the same jurisdiction we get market appraisal of the so 
called pure exchange rate risk, while comparing the difference between yield on the 
same currency but different jurisdiction issues we get country risk premium.  
 
An extremely important variable is spread between credit and deposit interest rate. 
This is why the next section is entirely devoted to discussing the spread and some 
similar indicators. Contrary to other surveys (e.g. Vuković, 2009, p. 106), which 
employed real interest rates, we use nominal rates to construct interest rate spread, 
since the latter approach has the virtue of largely avoiding mismeasurement 
problems that come from unknown inflation- expectations. Nevertheless, this 
framework is less able to capture the changes in credit market tightness.  
Interest spread and bank net interest margin 
Interest spread is the difference between the yield rate on average interest earning 
assets and the cost rate on interest bearing funds, with both elements expressed in 
percentage terms. Bank net interest margin (hereafter NIM), on the other hand, is 
computed by comparing net interest income, being simply the difference between 
interest revenue and interest expense, with average earning assets. Clearly, the bank 
interest margin and spread need not be identical unless there are zero non-interest 
bearing funds. NIM per se includes impact of all the interest rates on the bank 
income and, as such, explains better bank efficiency, but it also reflects changing 
composition of assets and liabilities. It is not flawless indicator of even bank pricing 
policy, let alone credit conditions. However, since banks’ efficiency drives the credit 
market it deserves to be considered. 
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Table 4: Net interest margin and interest spread (in %, p.a.) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
NIM 7.46 6.54 7.76 6.90 6.20 6.101 
NIM (max) 26.01 16.78 21.90 10.16 N/A N/A 
NIM (min) 3.57 2.77 4.93 3.18 N/A N/A 
Spread, RSD 10.82 6.05 10.79 6.72 6.88 7.732 
Weighted loan rate 15.88 11.13 18.11 11.78 12.43 14.242 
Weighted deposit rate 5.06 4.08 7.32 5.06 5.55 6.512 
Memoranda       
ROA 1.7 1.7 2.1 1.0 1.1 1.31 
ROE 9.7 8.5 4.5 4.5 5.4 6.51 
        Notes: 
1 
Data on third quarter; 
2
 Data on second quarter; 
 
NIM (Table 4 and 5) is calculated as explained above. Data on levels are from official 
NBS statistics, while the data on distribution (maximum and minimum) completely 
comes from Bank Scope database (Bureau van Dijk). The latter data are ratios 
directly selected from the database or recalculated from annual financial statements 
that come from the same data source. The data encompass majority of banks that 
operate in Serbian banking industry (over 99 percent of total assets). After turbulent 
2008, NIM set up for decreasing. Interestingly, for the last five years no bank have 
reported negative NIM, while the maximum skyrocketed at more than 25 per cent. 
In spite of high margin, the banking industry reports rather modest level of profit 
efficiency measured by return on assets, as well as return on equity. In none year 
ROE has been reported in two-digit numbers, while ROA exceeds two per cent level 
only once. Such results may indicate that some sources of inefficiency of local 
banking industry drives conditions on the credit market. It probably belongs to 
diseconomy of scale, or huge overheads.  
 
When expressing the interest rate spread as weighted average, one gets figures 
pretty much the same as those for net interest margin. In addition, both measures 
have the same flaws. The key issue in calculating NIM comes from the fact that most 
of credit granting and deposit taking activity related revenues and expenses enters 
no item relevant to calculate NIM. If the rates aren’t reported on the effective rate 
basis, the same holds for the spread. Further, the multicurrency structure of bank 
assets and liabilities make things complicated both in calculating average weighted 
spread and margin. By pooling the data on local currency denominated 
arrangements with those on foreign currencies we get the assessment with no real 
economic meaning. The following table (Table 5) presents data on spread separately 
for main currencies and two basic product lines: consumer (or retail) banking, and 
business (or corporate) banking, with results on Euro-denominated arrangements 
separated from results on local currency denominated ones.  
 Marinković S., Malović M. 289 
 
We should note that looking simply at the spread developments over time may be 
misleading, since the same spread may appear with deposit and lending rate moving 
simultaneously, with the same pace in the same direction. This is why we 
supplement the data on the spread with the data on relevant deposit and credit 
rates. This way we could track the changes which may indicate forces that drive one 
market, but that are completely irrelevant for the other. For instance, the increase in 
deposit rates during the turbulent times may be attributed either to increasing bank 
demand for deposits, or to undermined public confidence in bank soundness.  
 
Table 5: NIM and spread – quarterly survey on recent data (in %, p.a.) 
  2010 2011 2012 
  Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 
I NIM  6.30 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.10 N/A N/A 
 
Interest rate 
spread on 
       
II=1–2 
Consumer 
finance, EUR 
6.08 3.62 5.34 5.36 4.87 5.27 4.28 
1 
Loans in (pegged 
to) EUR 
9.66 8.28 9.54 9.65 8.55 9.96 8.65 
2 
Deposits up to 
one year 
3.58 4.66 4.20 4.29 3.68 4.69 4.37 
III=3–
4 
Consumer 
finance, RSD 
20.46 17.83 16.36 16.93 17.59 16.09 16.58 
3 
Short-term loan 
rate1 
29.51 28.46 28.12 27.66 27.46 25.73 25.98 
4 
Deposits up to 
one year 
9.05 10.63 11.76 10.73 9.87 9.64 9.40 
IV=5–
6 
Business finance, 
EUR 
5.22 4.60 4.34 4.93 4.43 3.98 2.74 
5 
Loans in (pegged 
to) EUR 
8.20 8.26 7.85 8.68 8.18 7.91 6.68 
6 
Deposits up to 
one year 
2.98 3.66 3.51 3.75 3.75 3.93 3.94 
V=7–8 
Business finance, 
RSD 
6.68 5.17 5.24 5.98 6.57 6.31 3.87 
7 Loan rate2  15.72 16.49 17.76 18.28 17.51 16.17 13.24 
8 
Deposits up to 
one year 
9.04 11.32 12.52 12.30 10.94 9.86 9.37 
Notes: 
1
 weighted average of rates on revolving, credit card loans and overdrafts for 
households;
2
 weighted average of rates on export, investment and working capital loans 
to businesses.  
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Estimating loan to deposit rate spread on this way demands right choice of a pair of 
rates. In order to control for interest rate risk we matched the rates of loans and 
deposits with as close as possible maturity. In official statistics the rates are reported 
among maturity baskets. Researchers’ best choice is maturity of less than a year 
since majority of loans and deposits comes exactly with this maturity. All rates 
present terms prevalent on the relevant arrangements made in reporting period, 
since they are able to fully express the way conditions change on the market.  
 
Several regularities appear. To begin with, the spread is much higher for consumer 
finance. The difference is especially apparent in arrangements denominated in local 
currency. The difference is driven almost completely by the loan rate. It is a well-
known fact that banks charge consumer loans with higher rate, and it is persistent 
over time. Thus, pooling the rates for all different kinds of loans would blur the 
picture. Differentiating allows for tracking down such features, which would not be 
the case if weighted average were used. Secondly, the spread is higher for local 
currency denominated than for the Euro denominated arrangements. Although it is 
true that higher inflation may explain some differences between the comparable 
rates expressed in different currencies, it is for the spread largely offset, since both 
loan and deposit rates are expected to accommodate for an anticipated inflation. 
We say largely, because even spread may account for inflation. Nevertheless it is in 
much lesser extent than appears in the data. The higher spread in local currency 
denominated arrangements may be an outcome of banks’ strong propensity to lend 
in foreign currencies, since it is a way to match currency structure of assets to that of 
liabilities. High exchange rate volatility (and uncertainty) might be also a 
determinant that spurs substitution out of RSD denominated claims. 
Unequal access to credit market and SMEs 
The studied effect on aggregates, rates and spread implicitly assumes that any 
change in credit conditions comes without sorting effect. However, an equally 
important side effect of worsening credit conditions comes from changed structure 
of borrowers. It is well-established empirical fact that credit crunch is squeezing out 
small businesses and entrepreneurs. Bruno (2009) shows that a capital crunch may 
have different impact on small and large businesses, depending on structure of a 
heterogeneous banking system. The author stresses that a shock to the capital of the 
bank specialized in financing of small businesses leads to a reduction of credit 
availability higher than a similar shock to the capital of the bank specialized in 
financing of large firms would bring about. Nevertheless, whether or not the banking 
industry is heterogeneous, there’s no doubt that a conservative credit policy favours 
the biggest, financially sound ones. However, what makes them sounder than 
smaller competitors?  
 
 Marinković S., Malović M. 291 
 
Although the issue certainly deserves to be considered, we here won’t delve into 
details, not because it is not important but rather because discussing the ways of 
solving this issue is well beyond the motivation that led us to write this chapter. Just 
briefly, we would like to underline that a significant share of the problems which are 
frequently assigned to credit market malfunctioning, actually originates from the 
economy’s structure. Namely, the first choice of any company in financing its growth 
is trade finance. How much can trade credit offset the credit cuts? It may be difficult 
for small companies to expand trade credit to other small companies because they 
too are being “crunched out”. Dominant position of the biggest corporations on the 
buying and selling markets assures enjoying trade credit from smaller suppliers or 
buyers. Therefore, SMEs are discriminated both by the banking industry and their 
dominant trading partners. Probably the key strategic battleground for the 
government is promotion of competition. This is the way to free market forces 
(financial and markets for goods and services) from the influence of dominant power 
structures. As Raghuram and Zingales (2003, p. 168) put it forcefully: “free market 
tends to jeopardize ways of doing business that rely on unequal access”. 
FROM CREDIT BOOM TO CREDIT CRUNCH: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF CREDIT 
GROWTH DETERMINANTS 
The survey above looks like a series of snapshots of developments in Serbian credit 
market and its banking industry. In this section we will proceed with a more rigorous 
analysis. The basic purpose of the following analysis is to point to the main driving 
forces of local credit market.  
Methodology, variables definition and data set 
Here we employ multiple linear regressions in order to study the relationship 
between credit growth and a set of macroeconomic and macro-financial variables. 
Both the sets of dependent and explanatory variables are chosen according to 
theory suggestions and subject to data availability.  
 
We have experimented with two different regressands: bank credit to private sector 
and total credit to private sector. Both are able to indicate the changes in volume of 
credit market, with some differences between them. The latter one is simply a sum 
of bank credit to private sector and cross-border loans. Since dependent variables, 
when expressed in levels, are strongly trended, we chose to first of all transform 
them into growth rates and then proceed with regressions. Time series contains 
monthly observations for last six years, for which the data were available.  
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Several variables are regular candidates for the set of explanatory variables. In what 
follows we will present definition of variables, data source and rationale behind 
including each of them. 
 
Output (industrial production) is constructed as the industrial production rate of 
change. Indexes are adjusted from the original source so as to have the same base 
(December 2006 = 100), since the original source operates with yearly change of 
baseline data point. The variable is introduced to capture the influence that comes 
from credit demand to the amount of credit outstanding. Although, the industrial 
production is not a proxy for credit demand as good as the actual GDP data, it is 
better suited for such an analysis because of monthly frequency. Visual inspection of 
data indicated that there might be a time-lagged influence of industrial production 
on credit growth. We experimented with zero (static) and three months lag (dynamic 
specification), while the table below shows only results for the dynamic 
specification, which proved to be a better specification.  
 
Lending to deposit rate is the ratio of average weighted lending rate (total loans) to 
average weighted rate on bank total deposits. It captures efficiency of credit 
intermediation. Note that it is a ratio, not a spread itself. Despite the shortcoming of 
representing the rates as weighted average, which has been discussed previously, 
this was the only data available for the entire period.  
 
Growth in deposits entered the set of explanatory variables in order to capture 
importance of local financial sources in feeding the lending boom and/or causing a 
crunch. In some specifications growth rate relates to the rate of change of Euro 
denominated total deposits, while in others it is CPI deflated. In both cases it is 
expressed as the rate of change in the reporting month relative to the previous 
month.  
 
Possible crowding out effect controls for the influence of bank credit to the public 
sector. For the sake of this analysis, public sector is taken more broadly than usual. It 
is an aggregate of banks’ claims vis-à-vis National Bank of Serbia, general and local 
governments, and public-owned enterprises. The core of this position is made of the 
claims to the NBS, mostly mandatory reserves and repo-stock. Therefore, it captures 
both the effects of regulations (mandatory reserves) and “flight to quality” 
behaviour (repo-stock and treasury issues). 
 
What follows is a set of variables intended to capture the relative importance of 
external sector to the local credit market dynamics. If foreign capital plays a crucial 
role in explaining credit dynamics, a right proxy able to capture differences in 
conditions available locally and abroad might also turn out to be beneficial for the 
analysis. A variable of prime choice arguably ought to be the interest rate 
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differential. We chose not to include the interest rate differential as it is, but to 
separate it into its main components.  
 
By decomposing nominal interest rate differential into the country risk premium and 
the pure exchange rate premium we were able to catch divergent forces that were 
blended into the nominal differential. The difference between yield on domestic 
asset denominated in foreign currency under domestic jurisdiction (represented by 
Republic of Serbia Forex bonds, known as A series) and Listed Federal Securities (LFS) 
mimics a market appraisal of country risk. Listed Federal Securities (LFS) are issued 
by the German federal government, with residual maturity of not less than a year. 
The yield is thus taken to represent the rate on foreign assets (under foreign 
jurisdiction) denominated in foreign currency. The country risk premium comprises 
both default and political risk premium. 
 
The difference between yields on domestic asset denominated in domestic currency 
and domestic assets denominated in foreign currency under domestic jurisdiction 
boils down to what is known as a pure exchange risk premium, since those assets 
differ only in terms of currency of denomination and expose agents solely to the 
exchange rate risk. It is calculated by subtracting yield on Republic of Serbia Forex 
bonds from two weeks repo rate.  
 
Drawing on a recent study of credit growth determinants in Serbia (Mladenovic and 
Palic, 2009) some proxy for the exchange rate volatility also joined the regressors’ 
set. E-GARCH (1, 1) model provided a time series of daily data on conditional 
variance, which is then re-sampled at monthly frequency. Different from the 
previous study, the variable is not exchange rate volatility itself, but conditional 
volatility of deviations from uncovered interest parity (UIP). UIP is a non-arbitrage 
equilibrium condition which links the yields on two comparable assets denominated 
in different currencies. The UIP has been set with local (BEONIA) and the referent 
foreign (EONIA) overnight interbank interest rates. If UIP holds, neither one of 
participants will be awarded an extra return. If deviations from UIP remain 
persistent, and therefore predictable, the funds will flow in or out of the country, 
depending on the direction of deviations. Thus, the volatility of deviations is 
expected to have adverse effect on foreign capital inflow and consequently on bank 
credit to private sector. This variable is the third element which together with 
country risk premium and exchange risk premium explains economic interest of 
foreign creditors. 
 
Real interest rate differential is computed as the difference between real rate local 
banks pay on local currency deposited for six months, and real Euro LIBOR rate (6 
months maturity). Since the pair of chosen rates represents deposit rates, the 
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variable portrays relative attractiveness of domestic vis-à-vis foreign bank financial 
sources.  
 
Real exchange rate (RER) enters the set of explanatory variables expressed either as 
base index or alternatively as percent deviation from trend. Real exchange rate 
RSD/EUR is derived from a nominal exchange rate index, adjusted for relative 
consumer prices in Serbia and the Eurozone. The trend was specified as a linear six 
year long time series. A slope coefficient is calculated for the entire period and 
relevant monthly data are further interpolated. The final data set is calculated as 
percentage deviation of actual real exchange rate data from the data expressing the 
trend. It is deployed to capture the influence of exchange rate, which does not 
directly concern the credit market.  
Finally, we investigate the interactions between credit growth and a dummy variable 
that is taken to be unity for months that belong to the turbulent times, and zero 
otherwise.  
 
Table 6: Multiple linear regression results 
 
Independent 
variable 
Dependent variables – Credit to Private Sector growth 
Bank Credit to Private Sector 
(BCPS) 
Total Credit to Private Sector 
(TCPS) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 
–2.194 
(–0.36) 
–1.240 
(–0.21) 
4.701 
(0.96) 
–3.424 
(–0.72) 
–2.937 
(–0.61) 
2.371 
(0.62) 
Output 
(indust. 
production) 
–0.001 
(–0.017) 
0.020 
(0.58) 
0.024 
(0.68) 
0.010 
(0.38) 
0.023 
(0.79) 
0.020 
(0.72) 
Lending to 
deposits rate 
–0.718 
(–0.84) 
–0.727 
(–0.93) 
–1.091 
(–1.34) 
0.434 
(0.65) 
0.292 
(0.45) 
–0.163 
(–0.25) 
Deposits 
growth (EUR) 
– 
–0.224 
(–1.95)* 
–0.258 
(–2.28)* 
– 
–0.045 
(–0.47) 
–0.029 
(–0.33) 
Deposits 
growth (CPI) 
–0.075 
(–0.57) 
– – 
0.061 
(0.59) 
– – 
Crowding out 
–0.072 
(–0.62) 
0.005 
(0.05) 
0.028 
(0.25) 
–0.007 
(–0.08) 
0.045 
(0.49) 
0.014 
(0.16) 
Country risk 
premium 
–1.442 
(–3.63)** 
–1.219 
(–3.14)** 
–0.951 
(–2.95)** 
–1.045 
(–3.36)** 
–1.029 
(–3.22)** 
–0.904 
(–3.57)** 
Exchange risk 
premium 
0.021 
(3.85)** 
–0.012 
(–1.99)* 
0.012 
(1.82)* 
0.008 
(1.99)* 
0.008 
(1.49)* 
0.008 
(1.73)* 
UIP volatility 
–0.006 
(–0.06) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
–0.004 
(–0.05) 
0.020 
(0.29) 
0.021 
(0.312) 
0.017 
(0.26) 
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Independent 
variable 
Dependent variables – Credit to Private Sector growth 
Bank Credit to Private Sector 
(BCPS) 
Total Credit to Private Sector 
(TCPS) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Real interest 
rate 
differential 
0.199 
(1.62)* 
0.122 
(0.99) 
0.072 
(0.59) 
0.003 
(0.03) 
–0.026 
(–0.26) 
0.011 
(0.12) 
RER (level) 
0.073 
(2.50)* 
0.047 
(1.53)* 
– 
0.046 
(2.01)* 
0.037 
(1.44)* 
– 
RER deviation 
from trend 
– – 
0.054 
(1.05) 
– – 
0.086 
(2.12)* 
Dummy (crisis) 
–0.170 
(–0.14) 
–0.006 
(–0.01) 
–0.024 
(–0.02) 
1.074 
(1.14) 
1.306 
(1.42) 
1.150 
(1.29) 
R2 0.692 0.721 0.711 0.761 0.760 0.776 
Adjusted R2 0.598 0.637 0.624 0.689 0.688 0.708 
F 7.421 8.541 8.126 10.539 10.485 11.436 
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are t–values; * Statistical significant at level of 10%; ** 
Statistical significant at level of 1%. 
Baseline results 
The regressions’ results separated significant variables from those which exert no 
real influence on credit growth. Statistically the most significant variable is country 
risk premium. It is estimated with predicted sign, i.e. inversely related to credit 
growth.  
 
The second component of nominal interest differential, a (pure) exchange rate 
premium, is also significant but contrary to above stated it exerts positive influence. 
It is a part of extra return garnered to foreign creditors and hence stimulates credit 
capital to flow in from abroad. The divergent influence of these components justifies 
decomposing procedure. If aggregated, the premia would offset each other, and the 
inference would be spurious.  
 
Amongst internal (domestic) driving forces it is deposit growth which exclusively 
exerts some influence on credit aggregates. As expected, the variable is important 
only for bank credit to private sector, whereas it shows no significance for total 
credit to private sector.  
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the results completely reject the importance of the chosen 
crowding out proxy for the growth of credit to private sector. Since mandatory 
reserves and repo stock take by far the biggest part of bank credit to public sector, 
the results imply that both mandatory reserve policy and repo operations failed in 
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serving their purpose. The most plausible explanation for this empirical regularity is 
that repo operations, contrary to policy maker’s intentions, actually have had 
expansionary effect on credit aggregates. The ultimate success of such a monetary 
policy instrument critically rests on the assumption that liability side of bank balance 
sheet remains intact. However, it rarely does really. Interest rate differential, 
boosted by the seep repo rate, stimulates foreign credit inflow.  
 
Be that as it may, the apparent irrelevance of inflation as an overall driving force for 
variables considered, deserves a closer scrutiny. Deposit growth deflated by CPI, as 
well as real interest rate differential seem to be less important than their exchange 
rate counterparts. It is widespread and pervasive use of foreign currency, both in 
raising funds and lending them further, that is responsible for absolute 
predominance of the exchange rate over the inflation rate. Real exchange rate (RER) 
appears significant in explaining both bank credit to private sector and total credit to 
private sector, with no real difference if the variable is expressed in levels or in 
percent deviations from the trend. The positive sign of regression coefficient means 
that strong local currency drives the credit market up, while weak currency pulls it 
down. Therefore, as underlined earlier, in the ambience of excessive euroization, the 
exchange rate becomes a prevalent choice in economic calculus of credit market 
agents.  
POLICY DISCUSSION AND OPTIONS 
In this section we review what we see as the possible answers to the issue from the 
policy perspective. We will review those which are most discussed in business circles 
and academia: i) public interventions from supply side, and ii) addressing excessive 
credit and liability euroization. Note that the list of policy responses is not exhausted 
by including those two policy packages.  
 
Recently, an ardent debate has taken place on issue whether Serbia needs a state-
owned development bank. When a crisis starts shaking the credit market and credit 
crunch comes to the point where there is no much left for free market to do, voices 
for public intervention overpower its opponents. However, how much, if any, of the 
boom-bust credit cycle can be attributed to market failure? Firstly, there were huge 
misalignments (persistent, long-standing deviations from uncovered interest parity, 
overvalued real exchange rate etc.) created by the exchange rate mismanagement. 
Secondly, the government drains credit market, by diverging loanable funds from 
private sector to the public debt. Thus, the origin of the problems seems to be very 
much a policy failure.  
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The ultimate effect of a development bank project is going to be limited and perhaps 
unsustainable. The funds for this purpose are going to be difficult to raise (on the 
respectable amount anyway) without crowding out private sector. In addition, 
Serbian government currently borrows the funds from the market at the rate and 
maturity which prohibits it to be competitive lender on the credit market. If the 
credit supply shoots up without adequate safety margin (default risk premium) it 
would only serve the purpose of temporary financial relief of some privileged clients, 
with no sustainable positive effect (Marinković and Golubović, 2011). This policy 
approach is expected to have nothing but fire fighting purpose with short lasting 
effects on credit market conditions. Instead of intervening with additional credit 
supply we propose more responsible fiscal policy. If, however, development bank 
succeeded in being a functional platform for bailing in the private banking industry in 
economic growth and export oriented lending, then there may be some rhyme and 
reason in the initiative after all. 
 
The second issue which surely deserves to be considered is excessive credit and 
liability euroization. The fragility of credit market is not exclusively a story of supply-
demand disequilibria, or rising rates, but also relates to structure of the credit 
portfolio. We have seen that the econometric analysis supports importance of 
exchange rate in determining credit growth. It is well documented fact that credit 
dollarization comes closely linked with liability dollarization (Luca and Petrova, 2008; 
Marinković, 2009b), which further corroborates that banks are well insulated from 
the exchange rate risk. However, while direct (balance-sheet) exposure to currency 
risk is avoidable by matching currency composition of assets with that of liabilities, it 
does not mean that lending (or pegging loans) in foreign currency makes no change 
in bank risk profile. In small open economies in transition, currency risk tends to turn 
into default risk. This, so called, spillover of the exchange-rate risk into default risk 
works either directly by undermining payoff capacity of foreign currency borrowers, 
or by triggering a vicious circle of mutual weakening of credit demand, supply and 
economic activity (Božović et al., 2009). Fortunately, national provisioning and 
capital adequacy regulation recognize this threat, and charge banks with additional 
regulatory costs when they lend in (or peg to) foreign currencies. 
 
One of the most controversial issues of all is to what extent exchange rate policy can 
contribute to the eurization (see Licandro and Licandro, 2003). Šošić and Kraft (2006) 
showed that in case of Croatia market participants replied in an asymmetrical 
fashion to real exchange rate misalignments. Undervalued local currency induces a 
portfolio shift toward a stronger foreign currency, while overvalued local currency 
typically fails in provoking reversal. Underlined asymmetric response is nothing more 
than a consequence of slow confidence recovery. It is easy to undermine public 
confidence, but takes much more time to reestablish it. The case of Serbia clearly 
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supports this regularity. Several switches between depreciation-appreciation 
regimes have had little if any changes in the level of financial euroization.  
 
Recently proposed policy agenda (NBS, 2011; criticized in Vuković, 2011) brings no 
novel approach in trying to solve the issue. It is based on three pillars: First and 
foremost, it advocates for responsible fiscal and monetary policy able to support 
macroeconomic as well as financial stability and growth. The second pillar contains 
measures that would promote the Serbian Dinar as the right choice for long-term 
investments. Primarily, the government is suggested to issue long-term debt in the 
local currency. However, those attempts proved to be unsuccessful on earlier 
occasions. In order to succeed in this effort the task earmarked in the first pillar must 
be fully achieved. The same precondition holds in case of the third pillar, which 
assumes mutual effort of NBS and the banking industry to establish a private market 
of financial instruments for currency risk management. Private market protection 
against currency risk is, alas, prohibitively costly in the ambience of monetary 
instability.  
 
Authorities also do not dismiss the use of wider set of prudential measures in favour 
of local currency. It is a clear sign that authorities fear the free market competition. 
Preferable tax treatment of Dinar denominated saving instruments, discriminating 
policy of mandatory reserves, and policy of risk assessments affect the preference 
set. Those measures imply additional costs to those who are using (or indexed in) a 
foreign currency. The ultimate effect is subject to the level of extra (by regulation 
imposed) levy and it has been already proved to possess limited effect. 
 
The first pillar, if implemented fully, makes the other two pillars superfluous. 
Moreover, it cannot be enforced with the other two pillars, because the ultimate 
effect of those measures, critically depends on the first one. Discussed policy 
packages remain closely connected, at least in terms of the ultimate precondition on 
which both packages critically rest. It brings more responsible and well-balanced 
fiscal policy on the forefront of policy responses. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The data on credit aggregates shows no alarming trend toward melting down of 
credit activity, although there are clear signs of credit growth decelerating. This is 
because a pre-emptive action prevented deterioration of credit conditions into the 
sharp credit crunch. The coalition that assembles the main stakeholders (foreign 
banks, National Bank of Serbia, IMF) was forged to alleviate the severity of the 
inevitable credit crunch. This firefighting measure has mitigated the problem, but 
with no power nor leeway to do so indefinitely.  
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It is now clear that the policy makers failed to smooth the adverse developments in 
the credit market dynamics and left the economy dangerously exposed to the 
proverbial boom-bust cycle. The econometric analysis carried out in this chapter 
underlined the importance of external determinants of credit growth. Exchange rate 
related determinants: real exchange rate, country risk premium as well as pure 
exchange rate risk premium proved to be the more significant amongst various 
tested variables, in explaining credit growth trajectory.  
 
The study underscores the importance of exchange rate management as a tool to 
avoid huge misalignments, for which responsible fiscal policy, until recently almost 
forgotten policy front, represents a necessary precondition and a potent instrument. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
Data Source 
GDP – Domestic National Statistical Bureau 
Industrial Production NBS, Real Sector Database 
Inflation – Domestic (CPI) NBS, Real Sector Database 
Inflation – Foreign (HCPI) Eurostat 
Bank Credit to Private Sector NBS, Balance Sheet of Banking Industry 
Bank Credit to Public Sector NBS, Balance Sheet of Banking Industry 
Deposits NBS, Balance Sheet of Banking Industry 
Cross-borders – External Debt of 
Enterprises  
NBS, External Sector Database 
LIBOR British Banker Association 
EONIA European Central Bank 
BEONIA NBS, Beonia Database 
Interest rates – Domestic, Various NBS, Interest Rates Database 
Exchange rate RSD/EUR NBS, Exchange Rates Database 
Nonperforming Loans NBS, Quarterly Reports, Various Issues 
NIM, ROA, ROE NBS, Quarterly Reports, Various Issues 
NIM (distribution) BankScope, Bureau van Dijk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
